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Abstract
This paper studies the short and long-term effects of exposure to Bono
de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), the main unconditional cash transfer program
in Ecuador, on young people’s education and labor market outcomes. Using
individual administrative panel data and a regression discontinuity design, I
estimate the short term impact of BDH, as well as the differential impact of a
long exposure (10 years) versus a short exposure to BDH (five years). In the
short-run, treated children experienced gains in enrollment and schooling, but
those gains dissipated after five more years of treatment. This explains why
after ten years of exposure, treated children aged 18-21 were not more likely
to finish high school when compared to similar children who were only treated
during the first five years of the program. Regarding labor market outcomes,
BDH had a negative but not statistically significant impact on the probability
of working among the young children who were treated either during five or
ten years and did not increase job opportunities among young adults.
1 Introduction
It has been widely accepted in the literature that factors operating during early
childhood play a more important role than tuition, school reforms, job training or
family credit constraints during college-going years in explaining gaps in socioeco-
nomic attainment (Carneiro et al., 2002; Cunha et al., 2010; Heckman, 2000). Cash
∗I am deeply indebted to Alistair McGuire and Stephen Jenkins for invaluable advice and
guidance and to Javier Brugue´s-Rodr´ıguez for helpful comments and suggestions. The data used
in this paper was approved and prepared by the Ministry of Social Development and SENESCYT in
Ecuador. This paper was prepared for the Annual Congress of the European Economic Association
(Lisbon 2017).
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transfers targeted to the poor have become the most popular tool in developing
countries to encourage investment in the health and education of young children.
These programs range from pure unconditional cash transfers (UCT) to fully mon-
itored and enforced conditional cash transfers (CCT) (Baird et al., 2014). A large
body of evidence shows that CCTs improve health and education among beneficiary
children (see Fiszbein et al. (2009) for a review and Saavedra and Garcia (2012) for
a meta-analysis). The literature about UCTs is smaller but it has regained attention
in the last few years, Hanlon et al. (2010) provide a review of the impacts of these
programs on schooling and Benhassine et al. (2015) provide more recent evidence
about the large effects of a labeled UCT on school participation in Morocco.
This paper studies the effects on young people’s education and labor market out-
comes of exposure to Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), the main unconditional
cash transfer program in Ecuador. BDH was launched in 2003; it targets women
with young children (0-18 years) in the bottom 40% of a “Selben” score distribu-
tion. The “Selben” index is a multidimensional poverty index built using principal
components analysis. In Ecuador, BDH has been subject to many short-term evalu-
ations, showing important improvements in schooling, cognitive and socio-emotional
development, and reductions in child labor among treated children (Edmonds and
Schady, 2012; Paxson and Schady, 2007; Schady et al., 2008). However, this may
not be enough to take these children out of poverty if they do not complete more
years of schooling or if they learn little during classes. Furthermore, it is not clear
that the short-term gains should persist through time.
Evidence of the impact of cash transfers in the long run is sparse. In a recent study,
(Aizer et al., 2016) analyzed the long-term impact of the Mothers’ Pension program
in the US on longevity, educational attainment, nutritional status, and income in
adulthood. In the study, the boys of mothers whose application to the program was
accepted lived one year longer than boys of mothers whose application was rejected.
They also obtained one third more years of schooling and had a higher income in
adulthood. Also for the US, Hoynes et al. (2016) used the roll-out of the most
important near cash safety net program in the US, the Food Stamp Program (now
SNAP), to evaluate its long-term impact. They found that access to food stamps in
utero and in early childhood leads to significant increases in educational attainment
and earnings.
In terms of developing countries, the few existing papers that examine long-term
effects focus mainly on Latin America (LA), firstly, because the eldest CCT pro-
grams started there (like Mexico’s PROGRESA /Oportunidades in 1997), giving a
sufficiently long time span to evaluate long-term effects. Secondly, because many
programs in the region had rigorous designs and implementation which facilitated
their evaluation. Since most of these programs are relatively young, the analysis
of long-term effects in LA center on the study of outcomes measured at the end
2
of high school or during early adulthood. Experimental evidence comes from Mex-
ico’s Progresa1 (Behrman et al., 2011, 2005) and Nicaragua’s CCT program Red de
Proteccio´n Social (RPS) (Barham et al., 2013b,a), while non-experimental evidence
comes from Colombia’s CCT Familias en Accio´n 2 (Baez and Camacho, 2011) and
more recently from Ecuador’s CT program Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH).
Schady et al. (2016) use a regression discontinuity (RD) design to compare the
outcomes of individuals observed 10 years after BDH’s implementation using the
initial assignment to identify the long term effects. They found a modest intent to
treat (ITT) effect of 2 to 3 percentage points increase on high school graduation for
women in households that were eligible for transfers when they were in late child-
hood. Results on secondary school completion for men were smaller in magnitude
and were not significant.
Molina-Millan et al. (2016) reviewed the evidence on the long-term impacts of CCTs
in Latin America and conclude that, with the exception of schooling, there is little
consistent evidence across outcomes for all the programs. Findings from the exper-
imental literature include consistent evidence of impacts on schooling (in Mexico
and Nicaragua), as well as some evidence of impacts on cognitive skills and learning
(in Nicaragua), socio-emotional skills (in Mexico) and off-farm employment and in-
come (in Nicaragua). The effects on other outcomes are generally not statistically
different from zero, but this may be due to lack of power or the small difference
in exposure between treatment and control groups, which is a common concern of
experimental evaluations in which ethical considerations determine that transfers
are not withheld from the control group for too long a period of time.
Considering that there was an important contamination of the original treatment
and control groups, in this paper, I study the short and long-term effects of an
ongoing unconditional cash transfer program, using administrative panel data to
control for individuals’ transitions in and out of the program over the years. This
allows me to address the question of whether the short term effects of BDH persist
or wear off in the long-run. To do this, I take advantage of the fact that BDH
uses a proxy means test (PMT) – the Selben index - to select beneficiaries; and,
1Other studies about Progresa have used short-term estimates to extrapolate to long-run pro-
gram impacts (Behrman et al., 2005; Todd and Wolpin, 2006; Attanasio et al., 2010). However,
there are some concerns about the results that stem from extrapolations; one is that short-term
evaluations may reveal only temporary improvements in the outcomes of interest, which may van-
ish as time goes by. Another is that they may fail to detect any impact because the time span
between the treatment and follow-up may be too short. (King and Behrman, 2009).
2Some differences between BDH and FA are that FA is a CCT while BDH is not. Furthermore,
the size of the transfer in FA is smaller (17 dollars) and varies with the age and number of children
in the household. Finally, FA expansion included first, a pilot stage applied to 22 municipalities
between December 2000 and March 2001; second, an initial expansion to 306 municipalities between
July and November 001; and third, a second expansion stage to include a further 303 municipalities
between February and March 2002.
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that it changed five years after the implementation of the program. The change to
the PMT, which marked the beginning of the second phase of the program, meant
that many BDH beneficiaries had to leave the program, while others remained on
it for nearly five more years. My identification strategy relies on the fact that at
the threshold of eligibility, the second assignment was independent from the first
assignment. This allows me to disentangle the short term effects of BDH from the
additional effect of five more years of treatment, hereafter the differential effect of
a long exposure (ten years) versus a short exposure (five years).
I use a RD design to identify the differential effect of a long exposure versus a short
exposure to BDH by comparing the outcomes observed at the end of phase two of
children who were treated for 10 years versus children who were treated only for
five years. The results are in line with the literature on short term effects of CTs,
namely, treated children experience short term gains in enrollment and schooling
by the end of phase one (Edmonds and Schady, 2012; Paxson and Schady, 2007;
Schady et al., 2008), but those gains disappear after five more years of treatment
by the end of phase two. This explains why children aged 18-21 by the end of phase
two, who were around 8-11 years when BDH started, were not more likely to finish
high school when compared to similar children who were treated only during phase
one. In terms of labor market outcomes, BDH had a negative but not statistically
significant impact on the probability of working among young children who were
treated either during five or ten years and did not increase job opportunities among
young adults.
This paper contributes to fill the gap in the literature about the short and long-
term effects of social programs that lack a randomized design. It highlights the
use of individual panel data to produce reliable quasi-experimental evidence of the
differential effects of long exposure to social programs that use a poverty index
(that changes over time) to target beneficiaries, an approach that is very common
in social programs in developing countries. In the next section, I explain the in-
stitutional background and operational aspects of BDH since its implementation.
Section 3 discusses the three sources of administrative data used in this paper and
the methodology used to build the panels. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy
used to identify the different impacts of BDH. Section 5 presents the results from the
RD design. Section 6 discusses some robustness checks using administrative data
from a standardized exam taken at the end of high school and Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
Ecuador has experienced significant progress in terms of poverty reduction in the last
decade. In 2005, Ecuador’s GNI per capita was $7,310 in PPP-adjusted current U.S.
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dollars.3 At that time 84.3% of the rural population lived in poverty as well as 35.1%
of the urban population.4. By 2013, Ecuador’s GNI per capita was US$10,720 in
PPP-adjusted current U.S. dollars.5 However, poverty remained a major concern for
policy makers with 57.8% of the rural population and 24.8% of the urban population
living in poverty.6
The reduction in poverty has been accompanied by a marked improvement in the
main educational indicators. The Ecuadorian educational system has three phases:
(i) initial education, for children ages 3 to 5 is not compulsory; (ii) basic general
education, is compulsory and lasts 9 years for children ages 5 to 15 years, and (iii)
baccalaureate lasts 3 years for children ages 15 to 18 years and is not compulsory.
Since 2012, at the end of the Baccalaureate, students have to pass a standardized
exam (ENES exam) to apply to university. Until October 2008, public education
was free only up to the tenth year of Basic General Education for children ages 5
to 15 years. In October 2008, the new Constitution declared that public education
should be free from the first year of basic education up to the undergraduate level
from the 2008-2009 school year onwards. Primary education is almost universal and
most of the recent efforts of the government have focused on raising the secondary
education enrollment rates. Gender differences in educational attainment are small
when compared for all males and all females (Garc´ıa-Aracil and Winter, 2006). By
2003, the net enrollment rate for the Baccalaureate was 42.1%, and it increased
considerably to 53.6% in 2008 and to 65.1% in 2014.7 Much of the increase in the
secondary enrollment rate has been attributed to a series of political and institutional
changes and to the implementation of social programs like BDH.
BDH was implemented in 2003, when the incumbent government merged two exist-
ing cash transfer programs: Bono Solidario (BS) and Beca Escolar (BE) and became
the first program to use a proxy means test to target the poorest families in Ecuador.
BS was an unconditional transfer to compensate poor families for the elimination
of gas and electricity subsidies in 1998, and targeted mothers with earnings below
40 USD per month, people with disabilities, and senior citizens.8 BE was a CCT
program that started in the late 1990s and consisted of monthly transfers of 5 USD
per child (up to two children per household), conditional on children’s enrollment
in school and a 90% attendance rate (Carrillo and Ponce Jarr´ın, 2009).
3Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
4Source: Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador (SIISE)
(http://www.siise.gob.ec)
5Source: World Bank World Development Indicators
6Source: SIISE (http://www.siise.gob.ec)
7Source:http://www.siise.gob.ec/agenda/index.html?serial=13
8The program had an open inscription process that relied on the identification of needy families
by parish priests, who were considered to have reliable knowledge of whom among their parishioners
was poor.
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By 2003, the BS had about 1 million beneficiary households and had been shown
to suffer from poor targeting and significant resource leakages (World Bank, 2005).
Unlike the BS, the BE was well targeted but its size was relatively small, approxi-
mately 150,000 households. Merging the BS and the BE to create the BDH involved
two important changes: (i) re-targeting of the beneficiary population using a PMT
called ’Selben’, and (ii) an adequate system to monitor compliance with the condi-
tions. The re-targeting proceeded smoothly. More than 500,000 households (50% of
the original BS beneficiaries) were disqualified and stopped receiving benefits, and
another 500,000 households were newly registered and started receiving benefits. By
contrast, the monitoring of the conditions was never enforced (World Bank, 2005).
By 2008, BDH was the program with the highest relative coverage rate in LA, cov-
ering 40% of the population (Fiszbein et al., 2009). BDH was initially publicized as
a CCT; women with children aged 0 to 18 years receiving the transfer were required
to take their children for health checkups and to enroll them in school. Compliance
with these conditions was supposed to be monitored every two months; however,
due to lack of administrative capacity, this did not happen. Nevertheless, the pro-
gram used radio and television spots to explicitly link transfers with the conditions,
and some BDH administrators stressed the importance of school enrollment at the
implementation stage (Schady et al., 2008). Furthermore, in 2008, the Ministry of
Social Inclusion (MIES) started a process of notifying the mothers who were not
satisfying the conditions as a first step to sanction non-compliance.9
In 2003 the amount of the monthly transfer was US$15 for individuals with families
in the lowest 20% of the Selben distribution, and US$11.50 for those located in the
next 20% of the distribution (equivalent to 12% and 9% of the minimum wage in
2003 respectively). Since then, the amount has increased progressively. In 2007,
the transfer increased to US$30 (18% of the minimum wage) for individuals in the
bottom 40% of the Selben distribution. In 2009, the transfer was raised to US$35
(16% of the minimum wage) and in 2013 it was set at US$50 per month (16% of
the minimum wage). The size of the transfer does not depend on the number of
children in the household, which may lead parents to choose the son in which they
want to invest the most.
BDH uses a proxy means test called the “Selben index”, which correctly predicts
that 95% of households in the poorest quintile are eligible for the benefits and
erroneously excludes 5 percent of them (Fiszbein et al., 2009). The Selben index is
computed every five years using the information contained in the “Registro Social”
(RS), which is a census of poor households that contains individual level data of all
potential BDH beneficiaries. The index is computed using a principal components
analysis that assigns numerical values to categorical variables. After obtaining the
9See Executive Decree No. 347-A of April 25 of 2003 published in the Official Registry No. 76
on May 7 of 2013.
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weights for each variable, the values are added using a linear transformation, and a
score ranging from 0 to 100 is computed. To make sure that BDH targets only the
population in the bottom 40% of the Selben score, the same process is reproduced
using a nationally representative survey. Once the cutoff is chosen; it is applied to
select beneficiaries in the RS.10
From 2003 until 2008, hereafter the first phase of the program, BDH targeted women
with children aged 0-18 years in the bottom 40% of the Selben distribution, namely,
women scoring less than 50.65 points (Ponce and Bedi, 2010). In 2009 a new Selben
score was computed (Selben II), using most of the variables used in the estimation of
the previous score and the information from the second wave of the RS (Ministerio
Coordinador de Desarrollo Social, 2009). From August 2009 until March 2013, the
administration used the new score to select beneficiaries, with a new cutoff point of
36.5 points(Buser, 2015).11
Figure 1 shows the chronology of BDH implementation and, specifically, the change
in the targeting rule in 2009 that coincided with the collection of the second wave
of the RS and marked the beginning of the second phase of the program. Figure 1
also shows the different lengths of treatment that exist and the children of interest
in this study. Regarding the former, a short exposure means that individuals were
eligible during one of the phases of the program either phase one or two; while long
exposure means that individuals were eligible during the two phases of the program.
Finally, individuals who were not eligible for the transfer may remain in this state
during phase one, phase two or both.
The group of interest in this study are children aged 0-18 years before the program
was launched in 2003, who grew up being exposed to BDH during phase one, phase
two or both. At the end of phase one, these children were approximately 6 years
older and by the end of phase two, they were approximately 11 years older. Their
exact age depends on the date they were surveyed in the first, second and third
wave of RS.
10This is why more than 40% of the population in the RS fall below the chosen cutoffs.
11Another change in the eligibility rule happened on March 2013 (according to the ministerial
agreement No. 197 of 28 March 2013), when the beneficiaries whose score was between 32.5 and
36.5 points were excluded from the program.
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Figure 1: Timeline of the implementation of BDH
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Selben I cutoff: 50,65 Aug 2009. Selben II cutoff: 36,5 New cutoff: 32,5
First Phase Second Phase
Age 0-18 Age 6-24
Short exposure 1
Age 0-18 Age 6-24 Age 11-29
Long exposure
Age 0-18 Age 6-24
Short exposure 2
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Description of the Data
Three sources of administrative data were used in this study, the Registro Social
(RS), BDH payment data, and administrative data on the ENES exam (Examen
Nacional para la Educacio´n Superior). The RS is considered a census of the poor be-
cause the first wave was conducted in 215 cantons of the 223 registered in the census
of 2010, and therefore covers most of the poor areas of the country. Furthermore, by
2008 the total number of households in Ecuador was estimated to be 3,392,851 and
the second wave of the RS covers 2,393,377 of those households (Ponce and Falcon´ı,
2011). It contains relevant information about BDH recipients and potential recip-
ients, namely, individual socio-economic information at the family and individual
level, the ID number of the members (when available) and the Selben score assigned
to each household.
To date, there have been three waves of the RS. The first wave covered 6,303,352
individuals and was collected between 2001 and 2007; however, most of the infor-
mation was collected before 2003.12 The second wave covered 8,068,957 individuals
and was collected between 2007 and 2013 with most of the surveys completed in
2008. The third wave was mostly collected in 2014, but data collection started in
2013 covering a total of 6,930,701 individuals. The last wave contains around 1.1
million fewer observations due to attrition and because, during the data collection
period, the last 2,458 sectors to be visited were excluded leaving 735,479 individuals
12Ecuador’s population was 12,628,596 inhabitants by the year 2000, 14,447,600 inhab-
itants by 2008 and 15,661,312 inhabitants by 2013 according to the World Bank data
(http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=ECU)
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out of the survey. The steps taken to build the panel with information from the
three waves of the RS is explained in the next section.
The second source of administrative data is data on BDH payments. This infor-
mation is collected on a monthly basis and gives an account of the amount and
periodicity with which beneficiaries collect their transfers from the different finan-
cial institutions. Compliance rates are high, over 90 percent every year. This means
that 90% of the people assigned to treatment cashed the transfer at least once per
year.
Finally, as the third wave of the RS is incomplete, I also use administrative data
from the ENES exam for the years 2013 and 201413 and merge these data with the
panel to estimate the impact of different lengths of exposure to BDH on high school
graduation rates.
3.1.1 Construction of the panels
The main challenge in linking the three waves of the RS is that many people do not
report an ID (particularly children in the first wave of RS). I built two short panels
(two-waves panel) and one long panel (three-waves panel). The size of the three-
waves panel is bounded by the number of matches between waves 1 and 2 because
fewer people reported an ID in wave 1. Merging the three waves of the RS by ID
renders 1,271,538 matches. Considering that each wave of the RS contains around
7 million observations, the amount of data that is lost is large. For this reason, I
use probabilistic record linkage to match the individuals in the three waves of the
RS covering the period from 2001 to 2014. For that, I used the 4 names (2 names
and 2 last names) and a common household ID as match keys. The algorithm takes
into account the fact that some family members leave or join the household as time
goes by.14.
By following the children instead of the mothers, I can rule out estimating the long-
term impacts on children who did not benefit from the program from the beginning
but moved in with a treated mother after a second marriage, and tell when chil-
dren that stopped living with their mothers stopped receiving the benefits from the
transfer. I address these complications by assigning eligibility status to children
according to the current conditions of the household they lived in and by assigning
the treatment to women who actually claimed the transfer each year. (See the Data
Appendix and Paredes-Torres (2016) for a complete description of the process to
build the panels).
13The ENES standardized exam did not exist before 2012. Data is only available from 2012.
14400,000 individuals in the three-waves panel moved to (or from) other households (Paredes-
Torres, 2016)
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(a) First wave (b) Second wave (c) Third wave
Figure 2: Kernel density graphs of the Selben score in each wave of the Registro
Social and the corresponding panel wave
3.1.2 Descriptive statistics
The main panel contains 2,961,079 individuals linked throughout the three waves of
the RS. The two short panels that follow individuals through waves 1 and 2, and
through waves 2 and 3, contain 4,631,690 and 5,439,749 individuals respectively. In
each wave of the RS, the sample in the long panel reproduces quite well the distri-
bution of the Selben score as shown in Figure 2. In general, the curves of the total
RS population and the sample follow a normal distribution that almost overlaps,
especially for the first and third wave. Table A.1 in the Appendix analyzes the link
rates for individuals and households for the three-wave panel in more detail. It is
important to bear in mind that around 30 variables were involved in the estimation
of the Selben index, among them, characteristics of the household head, features of
the house, access to services, assets, etc. This is why it is considered a good measure
in order to characterize households. The fact that the Selben distributions of the
panel and the corresponding wave are very similar means that the panel represents
households of all socio-economic backgrounds that are in the RS. As such, on av-
erage, people who did not report an ID (and could not be matched because of it)
are not disproportionately poorer. Only in the second wave does the panel contain
a slightly greater number of poorer households.
To correct for the fact that people with a valid ID are more likely to be in the panel,
I constructed sample weights so that the panel’s totals on key characteristics match
the totals of the corresponding wave of the RS. This process is known as raking or
sample-balancing. I included gender, education level, highest grade completed, the
number of years of education, birth year, employment, province, county and type of
house as auxiliary variables (Paredes-Torres, 2016).
The three-waves panel allows me to track the trajectory of the individuals in terms
of their educational attainment and eligibility status. Table 1 shows the number
of individuals who changed their eligibility status after the introduction of Selben
II in 2009. Given that the cutoff point for eligibility moved from 50.65 to 36.5, I
10
Table 1: Eligibility status for individuals after the the introduction of Selben II in
2009
2009
Ineligible Eligible Total
20
03
Ineligible 148,417 58,274 206,691
72% 28% 100%
Ineligible +/- 5p 88,642 47,529 136,171
65% 35% 100%
Eligible 433,123 1,735,492 2,168,615
20% 80% 100%
Eligible +/- 5p 173,275 213,518 386,793
45% 55% 100%
Total 581,540 1,793,766 2,375,306
24% 76% 100%
Total +/- 5p 261,917 261,047 522,964
50% 50% 100%
Notes: The table shows the transition matrix of the eligibility status to BDH before and
after the introduction of Selben II. The total is 2,375,306 individuals instead of 2,961,043
because in the first wave not all the households had kids below age 18.
expected to see a substantial number of beneficiaries leaving the program. In fact,
20% of the people on the panel who were initially eligible to receive the transfer left
the program by 2009 because they no longer met the selection criteria, and 28% of
ineligible individuals became eligible. Looking specifically at the individuals around
the Selben threshold established in 2003 (namely +/- 5 points from the 50.65 points
cutoff), almost 35% of the individuals who were originally ineligible changed their
status to eligible and 45% of those who were eligible became ineligible, which points
to significant contamination of the original assignment groups.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Regression discontinuity design
The discontinuity in the assignment rule allows me to recover the local causal effects
of exposure to BDH by comparing the outcomes of similar individuals who are just
below the threshold (hence eligible for the transfer) and just above the threshold
(not eligible for the transfer). With BDH, the probability of treatment does not
jump from 0 to 1 when the forcing variable crosses the threshold; in other words,
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the Selben score predicts substantial but not perfect changes in the probability of
treatment. In the Fuzzy RD design, the treatment effect is obtained by dividing the
jump in the outcome variable (Y) at the threshold to the jump in the treatment
probability at the threshold as in an instrumental variable approach or the analogous
Wald estimator. The different graphs in Figure A.1 in the Appendix show the jump
in the treatment probability at the Selben I threshold (50.65 points) and at the
Selben II threshold (36.5 points) for each year starting in 2005, the first year for
which payment data is available.
In the next section, I explain how I estimate the impact of BDH at the end of each
phase of the program, as well as the differential impact of a long exposure (during
phases one and two) versus a shorter exposure to BDH (during phase one).
4.2 Estimation
Several non-parametric methods have been proposed in the literature to estimate
the local average treatment effect (LATE). One corresponds to the series estimation
approach, which consists of the inclusion of polynomial functions of the forcing
variable and provides estimates of the regression function over all the values of
the forcing variable. The other non-parametric approach is kernel regressions. In
the simplest case of the rectangular kernel, one computes the local average of the
outcome (Y) in the closest bin to the left and right of the cutoff point and compare
those means to get the RD estimate. However, Hahn et al. (2001) argue that if
the true model is upward sloping on both sides of the threshold, the RD estimate
from kernel regression would be biased; moreover, any attempt to reduce the bias by
reducing the bandwidth size would lead to very imprecise estimates in the absence
of a large number of observations near the cutoff. To solve this problem Hahn et al.
(2001) suggest running local linear regressions at each side of the threshold instead
of computing local averages within the closest bins. Hahn et al. (2001) also proved
that this approach reduces bias by one order of magnitude.
In the case of BDH, eligible individuals are located on the left-hand side of the
cutoff, meaning that only people with a lower Selben score can benefit from the
transfer. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), the regression model on the left-hand
side of the cutoff point (S ≤ c) is:
Y = αl + fl(S − c) +  (1)
Y is the outcome variable, fl(.) and fr(.) are functional forms of the Selben score
(S) that measures the distance to the cutoff c, αl is the intercept. The regression
model at the right hand side of the cutoff point (S > c) is:
Y = αr + fr(S − c) +  (2)
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It is preferable to estimate the treatment effect with a pooled regression on both
sides of the threshold. The advantage of this approach is that it directly yields
estimates and standard errors of the treatment effect τ :
Y = αr + τT + f(S − c) +  (3)
where τ = αl − αr and f(S − c) = fr(S − c) + T [fl(S − c) − fr(S − c)] . The
treatment status T is instrumented by D, which is a binary variable that takes a
value of 1 when the Selben score is below the cutoff and 0 otherwise. It is important
to let the regression function differ on both sides of the cutoff point by including
interaction terms between T and S. In the linear case where fl(S − c) = βl(S − c)
and fr(S − c) = βr(S − c), the pooled regression is:
Y = αr + τT + βr(S − c) + (βl − βr)T (S − c) +  (4)
The simplest fuzzy RD estimator uses only D as instrument without polynomial
interactions of f(S − c) with D. In this case, I allow for interaction terms in the
first and second stage.
4.3 Short exposure
I first estimated the effects of a short exposure to BDH at the end of phase one. For
that, I compare the outcomes (observed at the end of phase one) of children who
were marginally eligible or not based on their proximity to the Selben score cutoff
of 50.65 points set on 2003. Likewise, to estimate the effects of a short exposure to
BDH, during phase two only, I restrict the sample to children who were not treated
during phase one and compare the outcomes of children observed at the end of phase
two with a Selben II score close to the cutoff for eligibility fixed at 36.5 points in
2009.
The analysis of the effects of each phase of the program is particularly important
in this setting because BDH was publicized as a CCT. However, due to lack of
administrative capacity the conditions were never enforced so it is very likely that
most of the impact was achieved in the first phase of the program when the transfer
was believed to be conditional at least for a short period of time (De Brauw and
Hoddinott, 2011; Baird et al., 2014; Benhassine et al., 2015). Furthermore, in Oc-
tober 2008, education became free in all public schools and universities in Ecuador,
which may have caused the transfer to cease to have an effect on eligible children,
since education became free for all eligible and ineligible children. It is important to
contrast the results obtained in each of the phases separately to be able to identify
the possible reasons why the effects of BDH may be different during phase one and
two.
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To estimate the effects of a short exposure to BDH, I estimate equation 4, where Y
is the outcome variable observed at the end of phase one or at the end of phase two
depending on the case. I instrument treatment with individual eligibility using the
corresponding cutoff depending on whether I am evaluating the effects at the end of
phase one or at the end of phase two. I try several bandwidths (+/-2.5, +/-5 and
+/-7.5 points with respect to the cutoff) and test the robustness of the estimates to
the inclusion of higher order polynomial terms. I estimate regressions for different
age groups and include county fixed effects and school year dummies because each
wave of the RS was collected over more than one year.
4.4 Differential effect of a long exposure vs a short exposure
Eligibility after 2009 was determined by a new Selben II score, which was computed
based on individual and household characteristics that were potentially affected by
the exposure to BDH in phase one. A woman who was exposed to the transfer
in phase one may have improved her poverty score enough to become ineligible in
phase two. Since a significant number of individuals changed their eligibility status
after the introduction of Selben II in 2009, and, given that the ones who did not
change their status are more likely to be different (the poorer are likely to remain
eligible during the two phases, while the richer are likely to remain ineligible), I
am not able to compare the “always treated” and the “never treated” because their
pre-treatment characteristics (and very likely their unobservable characteristics) are
very different.
There are two other ways to estimate the long term effects of BDH. The first mea-
sures the impact of being treated only during phase one (and not in phase two)
versus never being treated. However, this case is problematic because only the ini-
tial assignment would have been exogenous to pre-treatment characteristics while
the second assignment (at the beginning of phase two) would have been endoge-
nous. To compare these two groups based on the initial assignment, keeping enough
observations at the threshold, transfers would have to be withheld from everyone
during phase two (akin to a phase in design) which did not happen with BDH.
The other way to estimate long-term effects is to measure the differential impact of a
long exposure (during phases one and two) versus a short exposure to BDH (during
phase one). To do this, I compare the outcomes observed at the end of phase two
of children who were marginally treated or not during phase two among children
who were treated during phase one. Since most of these individuals were eligible
during phase one, and at the same time were very close in terms of their outcomes
in 2008, I would be comparing two groups of people that are very similar in terms
of observable and unobservable characteristics as shown on the balance tests (see
Table A.5 on the Appendix).
14
To estimate the differential impact of a long exposure (during phases one and two)
versus a short exposure to BDH (during phase one), I restrict the sample to individ-
uals who were treated during the first phase of the program and estimate equation
4, where Y is the outcome variable observed at the end of phase two and (S − c) is
a function of the Selben II score (S) that measures the distance to the cutoff (36.5
points).
As with the short term effects, I instrument treatment with individual eligibility and
try several bandwidths (+/-2.5, +/-5 and +/-7.5 points with respect to the cutoff)
as well as low polynomials of the distance to the cutoff to check the robustness
of the RD estimates to different specifications. I estimate separate regressions for
different age groups and include county fixed effects and school year dummies in the
regressions.
5 Results
For the identification strategy to be valid, individuals should not be able to precisely
manipulate their Selben score. This is unlikely in this setting because the Selben
index is a complex ”composite index” and its methodology has never been disclosed.
People do not know the weights associated with their responses when they are sur-
veyed, making it very difficult for them to determine which answers will make them
end up on the left side of the cutoff. Furthermore, the change in the methodology
in 2009, which involved the use of new variables to build the index, made cheating
even more difficult. Figure 3 shows that there is no evidence of bunching or ma-
nipulation of the Selben I or Selben II scores. Moreover, the density tests15 fail to
reject the hypothesis that the difference in densities on the two sides of the cutoff is
zero (See Table A.2 in the Appendix). These results rule out possible self-selection
or non-random sorting of units into eligible or ineligible groups.
For identification, it is also important that there are no imbalances in baseline char-
acteristics. To test for balance in the pre-treatment characteristics, I use a regression
discontinuity approach and estimate local regressions of different polynomial orders
using the observations within +/-2.5 points of distance to the cutoff. The variables
were chosen from the list of variables used to estimate the Selben score. I did this
with the people who were surveyed before 2003 in the first wave of the RS, and with
the people who became eligible for phase two, who were surveyed before 2009 in
the second wave. I also tested if among the former eligible children, those who were
considered eligible or not for the second phase of the program had balanced charac-
teristics. Results of the linear and quadratic specifications as well as the omnibus
15Cattaneo et al. (2016) propose a set of manipulation tests based on a novel local polynomial
density estimator, which does not require pre-binning of the data as opposed to McCrary’s test.
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Figure 3: Frequency distribution of Selben I and Selben II score
joint F-tests are reported in Tables A.3, A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix. In all the
cases, at least for one of the specifications, the p-value on the omnibus F test was
not significant.
5.1 Effects of a short exposure to BDH
Table A.3 in the Appendix shows that the pre-treatment characteristics of marginally
eligible children in 2002 (around +-2.5 points of the cutoff) present some minor im-
balances in the linear specification that disappear in the quadratic specification. The
quadratic specification performs better in terms of the omnibus joint F-test, but the
linear specification was preferred in terms of the Akaike information criterion (AIC)
and the goodness of fit test performed by jointly testing the significance of a set of
bin dummies included as additional regressors in the model in order to select the
optimal order of the polynomial (See Table A.6 in the Appendix for results of the
linear and quadratic specifications).
Table 2, under the odd numbered columns, reports the results of the IV regressions
estimated at the end of phase one. Results of the first stage regressions are reported
in Table A.9 of the Appendix, and results of the OLS regressions and ITT effects are
reported in Table A.12 of the Appendix. Treated children aged 17 to 20 years by the
end of the first phase experienced gains in most of the variables under analysis, and
children aged 13 to 16 years increased their enrollment rates. These children were
around 8 to 11 and 12 to 15 years old respectively when BDH started. In terms of
enrollment, the gain for treated children in the 13 to 16 age range is 3.3 percentage
points, while for children in the 17 to 20 age range, the impact is 6.7 percentage
points. Both estimates are significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2: IV Results. Short term effects of BDH by the end of phase one (odd columns). Differential effects of a long versus a short exposure
to BDH measured by the end of phase two (even columns) for different age groups.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II
Variables Age 5 8 Age 10 13 Age 9 12 Age 14 17 Age 13 16 Age 18 21 Age 17 20 Age 22 25 Age 21 24 Age 26 29
Enrollment -0.000841 -0.00398 0.00647 0.00715 0.0331*** -0.0390* 0.0669*** 0.0609** 0.0140 -0.00995
(0.00569) (0.00474) (0.00459) (0.0115) (0.0102) (0.0209) (0.0213) (0.0265) (0.0252) (0.0228)
Years of Education 0.0126 -0.0534 0.0845 -0.0494 0.0924 -0.152 0.276** 0.0315 0.0946 -0.158
(0.0567) (0.0707) (0.0551) (0.0662) (0.0648) (0.114) (0.111) (0.242) (0.190) (0.311)
Job 0.00281 -0.00269 -0.000385 -0.00205 -0.0138 0.0254 -0.0298 -0.0366 -0.0461* 0.0253
(0.00468) (0.00348) (0.00338) (0.00880) (0.00901) (0.0222) (0.0211) (0.0328) (0.0270) (0.0378)
Tenth grade -0.0182 0.0214 -0.0112 0.0358** 0.0510* 0.0126 -0.0145
(0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0156) (0.0284) (0.0226) (0.0386)
High School -0.000216 -0.00414 0.0618*** 0.00647 0.00790 -0.00398
(0.00544) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0335) (0.0267) (0.0411)
University -0.0181 0.0439*** -0.000775 0.0125 -0.0347
(0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0319) (0.0261) (0.0323)
Observations 13,836 19,661 24,986 28,159 26,895 20,885 21,181 11,970 16,265 7,458
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Table reports the results of the
IV regressions using a linear polynomial of the distance to the cutoff. Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben cutoff
(50,65 points) for ”Phase I” columns and within +/-2.5 points from the Selben II cutoff (36.5 points) for ”Phase II” columns.
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As expected, results at the end of the first phase in terms of years of schooling
were positive for the same age groups who experienced gains in enrollment. The
group who gained the most is children in the 17 to 20 age range; these children
were 12 to 15 years old when BDH started. For them, receiving the transfer during
phase one caused an increase of 0.276 of a year, or 55 days more schooling based
on a school year of two hundred days.16 This effect is statistically significant at 5%.
These results are in line with a higher probability of graduating from high school
for children in the 17-20 age group of 6.2 percentage points (significant at 1% level),
and a higher probability of 4.4 percentage points of being enrolled at university
(significant at 1% level).
Also in line with the previous results, the likelihood of having a job was negative
but not statistically significant for treated children aged 13 to 16 and 17 to 20 years
old and negative and significant at the 10% level for children aged 21 to 24 years by
the end of phase one.
5.2 Differential effects of a long versus a short exposure to
BDH
In order to identify the differential effects of a long versus a short exposure to BDH,
I tested among children who were treated in phase one, if those who were assigned
to be eligible or not in phase two had balanced pre-treatment characteristics around
the threshold. Results from the linear and quadratic specification show that those
characteristics are well balanced including in terms of the Selben I score, meaning
that the assignment in 2009 was independent from the first assignment in 2003.
(See Table A.5 in the Appendix). Both specifications performed well in terms of the
omnibus joint F-test, while the linear specification was slightly preferred based on
the AIC criterion and the goodness of fit test. (See Table A.7 in the Appendix for
results of the linear and quadratic specifications).
Table 2, under the even numbered columns, reports the differential effects of a long
exposure to BDH (during phases one and two) versus a short exposure (during
phase one). Results of the first stage regressions are reported in Table A.10 of the
Appendix, and results of the OLS regressions and ITT effects are reported in Table
A.13 of the Appendix. For the IV regressions, I follow the same cohorts of children
that were used to estimate the short term effects of BDH aged 5 years more.17 In
16The school year in Ecuador is composed of two five-month periods and its minimum duration
is two hundred days.(Ministerio de Educacio´n, 2012)
17The number of observations to estimate the effects by the end of phase one and to estimate the
differential effect of a long versus short exposure to BDH are not the same because the number of
individuals in the neighborhood around the Selben I cutoff is not exactly the same as the number
of individuals close to the Selben II cutoff.
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general, the initial positive effects observed at the end of phase one fade out by the
end of phase two, except for the children aged 22 to 25 years.
In terms of enrollment, children aged 18 to 21 by the end of the second phase (who
were 13-16 years old by the end of phase one) are the ones who saw their progress
slow down the most. The reason for this could be that the increases in enrollment by
the end of phase one did not translate into more years of schooling for this age group.
Moreover, these children may have dropped out school when the families realized
that conditions were not being monitored. On the other hand, children aged 22 to
25 still experienced gains in enrollment after five extra years of treatment. These
children were 12 to 15 years old in 2003 and became ineligible when they reached
18, which means that most of them were ineligible during the second phase of the
program. However, since they had experienced an increase in the number of years
of schooling by the end of phase one and had become closer to finishing high school,
it is likely that when they became ineligible for the transfer they kept studying
because public education became free at the baccalaureate and undergraduate level
in 2008.
In terms of years of schooling, five more years of treatment did not render additional
gains for treated children. There are no statistically significant gains in terms of
the likelihood of graduating from high school for children aged 18 to 21 years, or
in the likelihood of finishing tenth grade for children aged 14 to 17 years. There
is, however, a higher probability of finishing tenth grade of 5.1 percentage points
(statistically significant at 10% level) among children aged 22 to 25. One reason
for this could be that after education became free, parents who were receiving the
transfer could afford to send their older children back to school, without affecting
their younger children who were also able to attend public schools for free.18 In
Ecuador, and particularly in poor families, schooling increases with birth order
while child labor decreases with birth order (Haan et al., 2013). It is very likely that
children aged 22 to 25 years were the ones who had to drop out of school to find work
at an early stage. Furthermore, in 2005 the government implemented a program to
promote reintegration, which was successful in reducing the percentage of young
people between 19 and 24 years old who did not complete the Baccalaureate from
46.5% in 2006 to 35.29% in 2012 (Mineduc, 2012).
Finally, regarding labor market outcomes, a longer exposure to BDH did not have
a statistically significant effect on the probability of having a job among all age
groups. The effect was negative for the younger age groups and positive for children
of working age. Among children of working age, only those aged 22 to 25 years at
the end of phase two experienced a negative effect which coincides with the positive
and significant effects found on enrollment for this age group after ten years of
18Among children aged 22-25 in wave 3, only 13.45% did not have children below 18 years old
living with them.
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Table 3: IV Results. Effects of five years of exposure to BDH measured at
the end of phase two
Phase II Phase II Phase II Phase II
Variables Age 10 13 Age 14 17 Age 18 21 Age 22 25
Enrollment -0.00307 0.0160 -0.0661 0.0710
(0.0146) (0.0358) (0.0624) (0.0471)
Years of Education -0.156 0.517** 0.370 0.931**
(0.205) (0.210) (0.347) (0.439)
Job -0.0110 -0.0312 0.0300 0.0669
(0.0127) (0.0264) (0.0660) (0.0638)
Tenth Grade -0.0213 0.0335 0.121**
(0.0483) (0.0485) (0.0547)
High School 0.0170 0.0749
(0.0636) (0.0653)
University 0.0188 0.118**
(0.0522) (0.0570)
Observations 3,922 5,617 5,530 4,301
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table reports the results of IV
regressions using a linear polynomial of the distance to the cutoff. Sample
is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben II cutoff (36.5
points) who were not treated on phase 1.
treatment.
5.3 Results at the end of phase two among people who were
not treated during phase one
Table A.4 in the Appendix shows that among people who were not treated before
2009, the pre-treatment characteristics of the two comparison groups were balanced,
including in terms of the Selben I score for both the linear and quadratic specifica-
tions. The omnibus joint F-test favors the linear specification, which is also preferred
based on the AIC criterion and the goodness of fit tests. (See Table A.8 in the Ap-
pendix for results of the linear and quadratic specifications).
Table 3 reports the short-term impacts of BDH by the end of phase two among
children who were not treated during phase one. The results of the first stage
regressions are reported in Table A.11 of the Appendix, and the results of the OLS
regressions and ITT effects are reported in Table A.14 in the Appendix. Results
show a positive effect on the number of years of schooling of 0.93 years, equivalent
to 186 more days of schooling for treated children who were 22 to 25 years old
by the end of phase two. Treated children in the same age group were also 12.1
percentage points (significant at 5% level) more likely to finish tenth grade and 11.8
20
percentage points (significant at 5% level) more likely to be enrolled at university.
These children were 17 to 20 years at the beginning of phase two and should not
have benefited from BDH for more than a year. This points to the earlier discussion
about the possibility of parents investing in their older sons/daughters.
Children aged 14-17 years old by the end of phase two (who were around 9-12
years at the beginning of phase two) also saw an increase in their schooling of 0.52
years, equivalent to 104 more days in school. These results suggest that children
who were close to finish primary or high school when they joined the program were
the ones who responded more to the treatment; however, the gains showed clear
delays because poor children face face higher dropout and grade repetition rates
and experience delayed enrollment.
As in the previous section, the impact of BDH on the likelihood of having a job was
negative for the younger age groups and positive for the older age groups; however,
they were not statistically significant.
6 Robustness checks
Given the lack of results found at the end of phase two for high school graduation,
and considering that an important number of counties were left out of the third wave
of the RS, in this section, I use administrative data on the ENES exam (Examen
Nacional para la Educacio´n Superior) to test the robustness of the results regarding
high school graduation. In Ecuador, students have to pass a standardized exam
(ENES) to go to university. It is compulsory for all students enrolled in the last
year of high school at private and public schools; hence, taking the test is a good
predictor for high school graduation. The exam was first administered in 2012, so
it is possible to merge the 2013 and 2014 ENES databases to the last wave of my
three-wave panel using the students’ IDs. As in the previous section, I run similar
IV regressions to the ones I estimated before using as the outcome of interest a
binary variable that takes the value of one if the child was on the ENES dataset,
which implies that she was in the final year of high school, and zero if not. The
results can be found on Tables A.15 and A.16 of the Appendix.
The results are very similar to the ones I obtained in Tables 2 and 3. There is no
statistically significant impact on the likelihood of sitting the test for children who
were exposed to BDH during the second phase of the program. Neither are there
additional gains for being exposed to BDH for five more years for any of the age
groups considered (22-25 and 26-29 years). There is only a negative and statistically
significant impact on the likelihood of sitting the test for children in the 18-21 age
range. It is worth noting that some of the individuals who take the test are adults
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who want to go to university, which is why I can report results for older age groups
and not only for the 18-21 age group.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, I studied the short and long-term effects of a cash transfer program
that uses a proxy means test to select beneficiaries. The results provided here are
more informative from a policy perspective than those of studies that look at how
well the original treatment and control groups perform after several years. Said
framework is common in the evaluation of short-duration programs but may not
be optimal for the evaluation of long duration programs because is hard to rule
out people leaving or joining the program as time goes by, which may cause an
attenuation of the program’s impact and makes it difficult to say if the observed
effects were achieved due to a long or a short exposure to the program. The main
finding of the paper is that the short term effects of BDH (UCT) were important
and similar in magnitude to those found for other CCT programs, but five more
years of exposure to BDH did not render additional gains in terms of enrollment
and schooling for most of the age groups. Consequently, the short term effects found
in this paper should be considered as a lower bound of BDH’s long-term effects, in
particular for stock variables like years of education or the likelihood of finishing
high school.
Thanks to the availability of individual-level administrative data that allowed me
to build a series of short and long panels to control for individuals’ transitions in
and out of the program over the years, I was able to study the long term effects of
BDH even in the presence of substantial contamination of the original treatment and
control groups at the beginning of phase two. Furthermore, by following the children
instead of the mothers, I avoided estimating the long-term effects on children who
had not benefited from the program from the beginning, but had moved in with a
treated mother after a second marriage. Furthermore, I could identify children that
stopped living with their mothers at some point to avoid assigning them a wrong
treatment status. Ignoring these family dynamics may cause an attenuation of the
real effects of the program.19
The results from the IV regressions in this paper showed that the higher effects
on enrollment and schooling were achieved by children that were close to complete
primary or high school when they first joined the program. The observed short term
gains disappeared after five more years of treatment for most age groups except for
children aged 22 to 25 by the end of phase two, who started treatment in 2003 at
19Paredes-Torres (2016) documents the proportion of the population that left their original
households between the first and third wave of the RS and their characteristics.
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ages 12 to 15. The fact that education became free up to university level at public
establishments could also explain why the effects on enrollment for this age group
persisted.
There are several factors that can explain why BDH did not achieve its goal of
improving educational attainment consistently in the long run. One is the lack
of monitoring of the conditions. It seems plausible that at the beginning of the
program people believed that they had to send their children to school to keep
receiving the transfer, but with time they discovered that it was not a requirement
and only continued to support children who were close to complete primary or high
school. In a study for Ecuador, Schady et al. (2008) found that the short-term
gains from BDH were significantly larger among households who believed that there
was a school enrollment requirement attached to transfers. Evidence from micro-
simulation models for Mexico and Brazil also conclude that conditions attached
to transfers explain the bulk of the effect of CCT programs on school enrollment
(Bourguignon et al., 2002; Todd and Wolpin, 2006). Another reason could be that
the transfer was not big enough to compensate for the wages that children close to
complete high school could get in the labor market.
Regarding labor market outcomes, results showed a negative but not statistically
significant effect on the probability of working particularly among young children.
This is in line with the literature, which reports that cash transfers are a good
mechanism for the reduction of child work. However, the positive short term effects
found on schooling did not seem to give treated children an advantage in the labor
market later on. This could be explained by the size of the samples used and also
by the economic crisis that started around 2009 and persisted for several years.
The results from this paper stress the need for a redesign of BDH. Considering
that public education is now free, it may be necessary to redirect the objectives of
BDH. BDH may now focus on two critical groups: children aged 0-5 years and 15-18
years who are at higher risk of dropping out of school. Transfers should take into
account the number of children in the household and should increase with age in
order to reduce the opportunity cost from work for children aged 15 to 18 years.
Furthermore, the government should set a limit for the maximum number of years
that families can remain in the program (possibly five years).
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A Appendix
Data Appendix
In this section I explain in a very concise way how I built the panel that links the
three waves of RS. For more details see Paredes-Torres (2016). To merge individuals
without id, who belong to a household where at least one member has a valid id, I
used the 4 names (2 names and 2 last names) and a common household id as match
keys. I focused first on the merge between waves 1 and 2 and then between waves 2
and 3 to maximize the number of matches in each case. I first merged wave 1 and
wave 2 by individual id and build a household id (hhold) that was common to waves
1 and 2. The latter was built by concatenating the household id in wave 1 (idh1)
and the household id in wave 2 (idh2). I assigned this new household id (hhold) to
all the family members of the person with id in both waves. In this way, I was able
to track the complete households and just needed to use names and last names to
link the individuals inside those households. This exercise was repeated for waves 2
and 3.
To solve the problem of individuals leaving or joining the household as time goes by.
I focused on the sample of households where I observed a change in the number of
individuals with id. Then, if in wave 1 for example there was a household with two
adults and each one shared the same first part of the common household identifier
which is idh1 but not the second part which is idh2 because they got divorced, to
identify their children I had to look for them in the two households that were formed
after the divorce because it is not clear how many children if any moved with each
parent. This is a simplified example of a household that separates into two but in
the data, there are many possible scenarios and it was necessary to try all possible
combinations. As before, this step was repeated for waves 2 and 3.
Finally, to assess the quality of the linkage, I used the acceptance sampling approach
and followed the ANSI AQL tables to choose the size of the samples that were
checked manually using the Stata command <clrevmatch>.
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Table A.1: Number of individuals in the tree-wave panel with respect to the total
on each of the three waves
Total Likely linked % Actually linked % Actual/Likely
First wave of the RS
househ. 1,583,617 1,022,164 65 1,068,188 105
indiv. 6,302,861 4,221,610 67 2,961,079 70
Second wave of the RS
househ. 1,910,165 967,454 51 1,036,012 107
indiv. 8,068,957 4,447,300 55 2,961,079 67
Third wave of the RS
househ. 1,758,401 984,356 56 1,179,668 120
indiv. 6,930,712 4,181,534 60 2,961,079 71
Notes: (i) Each wave has a total of 6.3, 8 and 6.9 million individuals respectively. Among them around 4.2, 4.5
and 4.2 million individuals belong to a family where at least one member has an id (called the ”likely to be linked”
sample). The individuals in the final three wave panel represent 70%, 67% and 71% of the ”likely to be linked”
sample on each wave. (ii) With households, the link rate is higher and exceeds 100% because over the years some
households split, which increases the number of households. (iii) The size of the three-wave panel is bounded by the
number of matches between waves 1 and 2 because less people reported an id in wave 1; however, there are other
1,26 million individuals that could be tracked through waves 1 and 2 but not through waves 1, 2 and 3; and other
1,48 million individuals that could be tracked only through waves 2 and 3.
Table A.2: Density tests for Selben I and Selben II
left of SelbenI cuttof right of SelbenI cuttof left of SelbenII cuttof right of SelbenII cuttof
Observations 651103 171121 555666 244332
Effective Observations 43763 36769 39043 40559
Bias corrected density 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Standard error 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bandwidth values 1.54 1.55 2.00 2.27
Standard error test 0.00 0.00
p-value 0.64 0.94
Notes: Density tests based on Cattaneo et al. (2016). This local polynomial density estimator does not require
pre-binning of the data as opposed to McCrary’s test.
29
Figure A.1: Proportion of treated households with respect to the threshold by year
(a) 2005 (b) 2006 (c) 2007
(d) 2008 (e) 2009 (f) 2010
(g) 2011 (h) 2012 (i) 2013
Notes: Graphs use RS data merged with administrative payments data. Sample is the same households in the
balance tests. The graphs show the proportion of households that received the treatment each year. The cutoff
for the years 2005-2008 is 50.65 points and the cutoff for the years 2009-2013 is 36.5 points. The change in the
assignment rule happened in August 2009 but the 2008 graph also exhibit some adjustment. In particular the 2008
payments data set contains 676,068 individuals while the 2007 and 2009 data sets contain 1,127,909 and 1,280,367
individuals respectively.
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Table A.3: Balance tests for pre-treatment characteristics (2002) for the analysis of
a short exposure during phase one
Variables Pt Est 1 Std Err 1 Pt Est 2 Std Err 2
land -0.0117** (0.00546) -0.0180** (0.00818)
electricity 0.00138* (0.000731) 0.000621 (0.00110)
no exclusive shower 0.00343 (0.00300) 0.00270 (0.00459)
Overcrowding 0.000363 (0.00630) -0.000143 (0.00950)
members 0.00916 (0.0188) 0.00474 (0.0283)
totearners 0.000235 (0.0106) -0.0111 (0.0159)
tothholdwork 0.00771 (0.00701) 0.000952 (0.0105)
below18 0.00678 (0.0132) 0.0286 (0.0199)
totstudy 0.0114 (0.0119) 0.0271 (0.0179)
educ level head 0.0190* (0.0109) 0.0105 (0.0164)
job head 0.00901** (0.00451) 0.00267 (0.00677)
native language head -0.000442 (0.00223) 5.01e-05 (0.00334)
retired head -0.000450 (0.000859) 0.000284 (0.00122)
years educ head 0.0471 (0.0463) 0.0434 (0.0694)
Joint F-test 19.50 10.32
P-value 0.1467 0.7386
Observations 94,965 94,965
Notes: Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample is households surveyed before 2003 in the first wave of RS that have an adult
woman and children below age 18.
31
Table A.4: Balance tests for pre-treatment characteristics (2008) for the analysis of
short exposure during the second phase of the program
Variables Pt Est 1 Std Err 1 Pt Est 2 Std Err 2
selben1 -0.0977 (0.192) 0.122 (0.289)
land -0.00466 (0.00706) -0.0116 (0.0107)
electricity 0.000447 (0.00140) 0.00167 (0.00212)
no exclusive shower 0.00153 (0.00847) -0.00725 (0.0126)
Overcrowding -0.00290 (0.00856) -0.00510 (0.0128)
members 0.0220 (0.0382) 0.0683 (0.0575)
totearners -0.00413 (0.0159) 0.0280 (0.0234)
tothholdwork -0.00189 (0.0140) 0.0120 (0.0211)
below18 0.0238 (0.0287) 0.0357 (0.0431)
totstudy 0.0161 (0.0268) 0.00128 (0.0402)
educ level head -0.0176 (0.0387) 0.0198 (0.0583)
job head -0.000451 (0.00970) 0.0203 (0.0147)
native language head -0.000207 (0.00365) -0.000543 (0.00540)
retired head -0.00123 (0.00126) -0.00281* (0.00163)
years educ head 0.0240 (0.0966) 0.133 (0.145)
Joint F-test 4.77 12.88
P-value 0.9939 0.6113
Observations 22,811 22,811
Notes: Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.Sample is households surveyed before 2009 in the second wave of RS that have
an adult woman and children below age 18.
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Table A.5: Balance tests for pre-treatment characteristics (2008) for the analysis of
long vs short exposure to BDH
Variables Pt Est 1 Std Err 1 Pt Est 2 Std Err 2
selben1 -0.0108 (0.0809) -0.0926 (0.121)
land -0.00157 (0.00417) -0.00212 (0.00622)
electricity 0.000776 (0.000881) 0.000221 (0.00138)
no exclusive shower -0.00264 (0.00495) 0.00254 (0.00737)
Overcrowding -0.000476 (0.00548) 0.00724 (0.00818)
members -0.0115 (0.0251) -0.000694 (0.0375)
totearners -0.00601 (0.0105) -0.00974 (0.0157)
tothholdwork -0.00797 (0.00879) 0.00444 (0.0132)
below18 -0.0155 (0.0193) -0.0133 (0.0287)
totstudy -0.00847 (0.0171) -0.0134 (0.0254)
educ level head -0.0236 (0.0225) -0.0424 (0.0337)
job head -0.00344 (0.00606) -0.000756 (0.00902)
native language head -0.000198 (0.00226) 0.000904 (0.00323)
retired head 0.000573 (0.000592) 0.000565 (0.000881)
years educ head -0.0445 (0.0580) -0.0849 (0.0864)
Joint F-test 7.23 5.71
P-value 0.9508 0.9842
Observations 56,872 56,872
Notes: Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample is households surveyed before 2009 in the second wave of RS that have an adult
woman and children below age 18.
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Table A.6: IV regressions. Effect of a short exposure to BDH (during phase 1)
Variables Lin 5 8 Quad 5 8 Lin 9 12 Quad 9 12 Lin 13 16 Quad 13 16 Lin 17 20 Quad 17 20 Lin 21 24 Quad 21 24
Enrollment -0.000841 -0.00564 0.00647 -0.00308 0.0331*** 0.0154 0.0669*** 0.0946*** 0.0140 -0.0450
(0.00569) (0.00841) (0.00459) (0.00640) (0.0102) (0.0151) (0.0213) (0.0331) (0.0252) (0.0385)
Constant 1.021*** 1.026*** 0.985*** 0.991*** 0.924*** 0.952*** 0.463 0.456 0.219 0.200
Years of Education 0.0126 0.0642 0.0845 0.0105 0.0924 0.0267 0.276** 0.415** 0.0946 -0.0596
(0.0567) (0.0846) (0.0551) (0.0795) (0.0648) (0.0943) (0.111) (0.170) (0.190) (0.288)
Constant 6.844*** 6.810*** 9.447*** 9.484*** 6.853** 7.078** 11.83*** 11.81*** 9.933*** 9.882***
Job 0.00281 0.00521 -0.000385 0.000994 -0.0138 0.00353 -0.0298 -0.0627* -0.0461* 0.0167
(0.00468) (0.00668) (0.00338) (0.00470) (0.00901) (0.0133) (0.0211) (0.0329) (0.0270) (0.0413)
Constant -0.0182*** -0.0207** 0.00293 0.00333 0.0216 -0.00253 0.636** 0.643** 0.931*** 0.950***
Tenth Grade 0.00304 0.00759 0.0214 -0.000109 0.0358** 0.0470* 0.0126 -0.00727
(0.00327) (0.00469) (0.0163) (0.0242) (0.0156) (0.0245) (0.0226) (0.0344)
Constant 0.557 0.554 1.025*** 1.103*** 0.950*** 0.948*** 0.841*** 0.835***
High School -0.000216 -0.00489 0.0618*** 0.0941*** 0.00790 -0.0346
(0.00544) (0.00810) (0.0214) (0.0332) (0.0267) (0.0407)
Constant 0.550 0.550 0.763*** 0.758*** 0.850*** 0.837***
University 0.000527 -0.00521 0.0439*** 0.00975 0.0125 -0.00743
(0.00362) (0.00525) (0.0169) (0.0260) (0.0261) (0.0397)
Constant -0.00440 0.00156 0.763*** 0.764*** 0.430* 0.423*
Observations 13,836 13,836 24,986 24,986 26,895 26,895 21,181 21,181 16,265 16,265
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table reports the results of IV regressions at
the end of phase 1 for different age groups. Regressions include linear and quadratic polynomials of the distance to the cutoff. Sample is children with Selben
score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben cutoff (50.65 points). The P-values from goodness of fit test are shown after standard errors. The goodness of fit
test is obtained by jointly testing the significance of a set of bin dummies included as additional regressors in the model. The optimal order of the polynomial
is chosen using Akaike’s criterion (penalized cross-validation).
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Table A.7: IV regressions. Differential effect of a long exposure (phases 1 and 2) versus a short exposure (phase 1)
Variables Lin 10 13 Quad 10 13 Lin 14 17 Quad 14 17 Lin 18 21 Quad 18 21 Lin 22 25 Quad 22 25 Lin 26 29 Quad 26 29
Enrollment -0.00398 -0.00288 0.00715 0.0260 -0.0390* -0.0627 0.0609** 0.0913* -0.00995 -0.0490
(0.00474) (0.00862) (0.0115) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0382) (0.0265) (0.0507) (0.0228) (0.0423)
Constant 0.992*** 0.993*** 0.836*** 0.819*** 0.325*** 0.343*** 0.144*** 0.129*** 0.00343 0.0281
Years of Education -0.0534 -0.0801 -0.0494 -0.125 -0.152 -0.417** 0.0315 -0.498 -0.158 -0.390
(0.0707) (0.127) (0.0662) (0.121) (0.114) (0.205) (0.242) (0.471) (0.311) (0.559)
Constant 6.322*** 6.340*** 9.174*** 9.227*** 10.51*** 10.71*** 10.63*** 10.92*** 8.687*** 8.774***
Job -0.00269 -0.00213 -0.00205 -0.00445 0.0254 0.0989** -0.0366 -0.0232 0.0253 0.0234
(0.00348) (0.00651) (0.00880) (0.0159) (0.0222) (0.0407) (0.0328) (0.0629) (0.0378) (0.0680)
Constant 0.00705 0.00641 0.117*** 0.121*** 0.489*** 0.440*** 0.694*** 0.690*** 0.846*** 0.852***
Tenth Grade -0.0182 -0.0143 -0.0112 -0.0350 0.0510* -0.00721 -0.0145 -0.0695
(0.0164) (0.0301) (0.0161) (0.0289) (0.0284) (0.0550) (0.0386) (0.0689)
Constant 0.672*** 0.667*** 0.733*** 0.753*** 0.645*** 0.671*** 0.427*** 0.446***
High School -0.00414 -0.0251 0.00647 -0.0818 -0.00398 -0.0148
(0.0214) (0.0388) (0.0335) (0.0660) (0.0411) (0.0737)
Constant 0.605*** 0.612*** 0.624*** 0.677*** 0.359*** 0.366***
University -0.0181 -0.0397 -0.000775 0.00514 -0.0347 -0.0645
(0.0170) (0.0308) (0.0319) (0.0611) (0.0323) (0.0585)
Constant 0.170*** 0.185*** 0.225*** 0.230*** 0.0945* 0.109*
Observations 19,661 19,661 28,159 28,159 20,885 20,885 11,970 11,970 7,458 7,458
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table reports the results of IV regressions at the
end of phase 2 for different age groups. Regressions include linear and quadratic polynomials of the distance to the cutoff. Sample is children with Selben score
within +/-2.5 points from the Selben II cutoff (36.5 points) who were eligible on phase 1. The P-values from goodness of fit test are shown after standard errors.
The goodness of fit test is obtained by jointly testing the significance of a set of bin dummies included as additional regressors in the model. The optimal order
of the polynomial is chosen using Akaike’s criterion (penalized cross-validation).
35
Table A.8: IV regressions. Effect of a short exposure to BDH (during phase 2 only) among untreated children in phase
1
Variables Lin 10 13 Quad 10 13 Lin 14 17 Quad 14 17 Lin 18 21 Quad 18 21 Lin 22 25 Quad 22 25
Enrollment -0.00307 0.0225 0.0160 0.0862 -0.0661 -0.177 0.0710 0.136
(0.0146) (0.0290) (0.0358) (0.0575) (0.0624) (0.111) (0.0471) (0.0868)
Constant 1.005*** 0.987*** 0.958*** 0.936*** 0.474*** 0.623*** 0.0660 0.0424
Years of Education -0.156 -0.274 0.517** 0.615* 0.370 0.310 0.931** 2.134**
(0.205) (0.466) (0.210) (0.340) (0.347) (0.569) (0.439) (0.872)
Constant 6.019*** 6.127*** 9.002*** 8.995*** 10.94*** 10.91*** 9.412*** 8.976***
Job -0.0110 -0.0171 -0.0312 -0.0748* 0.0300 0.00241 0.0669 0.237*
(0.0127) (0.0280) (0.0264) (0.0418) (0.0660) (0.108) (0.0638) (0.125)
Constant 0.00958 0.0166 0.0890* 0.102* 0.280*** 0.324** 0.645*** 0.583***
Tenth Grade -0.0213 -0.0488 0.0335 0.0558 0.121** 0.254**
(0.0483) (0.0775) (0.0485) (0.0804) (0.0547) (0.106)
Constant 0.549*** 0.558*** 0.788*** 0.748*** 0.582*** 0.534***
High School 0.0170 0.0552 0.0749 0.286**
(0.0636) (0.104) (0.0653) (0.133)
Constant 0.620*** 0.579*** 0.343*** 0.267*
University 0.0188 0.00181 0.118** 0.208*
(0.0522) (0.0858) (0.0570) (0.108)
Constant 0.154** 0.174* 0.0709 0.0383
Observations 3,922 3,922 5,617 5,617 5,530 5,530 4,301 4,301
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table reports the
results of IV regressions at the end of phase 2 for different age groups. Regressions include linear and quadratic polynomials of the
distance to the cutoff. Sample is children with Selben score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben cutoff (36.5 points) who were ineligible
on phase 1. The P-values from goodness of fit test are shown after standard errors. The goodness of fit test is obtained by jointly
testing the significance of a set of bin dummies included as additional regressors in the model. The optimal order of the polynomial is
chosen using Akaike’s criterion (penalized cross-validation).
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Table A.9: First stage regressions. Short exposure to BDH (during phase
1)
Regression on: Age 5 8 Age 9 12 Age 13 16 Age 17 20
Enrollment 0.740*** 0.773*** 0.783*** 0.685***
(0.0114) (0.00806) (0.00797) (0.0102)
R2 0.567 0.607 0.618 0.497
Years of Education 0.740*** 0.773*** 0.783*** 0.685***
(0.0114) (0.00806) (0.00797) (0.0102)
R2 0.567 0.607 0.618 0.497
Job 0.740*** 0.773*** 0.783*** 0.685***
(0.0114) (0.00806) (0.00797) (0.0102)
R2 0.567 0.607 0.618 0.497
Tenth Grade 0.773*** 0.783*** 0.685***
(0.00806) (0.00797) (0.0102)
R2 0.607 0.618 0.497
High School 0.783*** 0.685***
(0.00797) (0.0102)
R2 0.618 0.497
University 0.783*** 0.685***
(0.00797) (0.0102)
R2 0.618 0.497
N 13,848 24,986 26,895 21,181
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the effect of
the instrument on treatment probability (first stage regressions) for each
of the outcome variables for which IV regressions were estimated. Sample
is children with Selben score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben cutoff
(50.65 points). Regressions include a linear polynomial of the distance to
the cutoff.
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Table A.10: First stage regressions. Differential effect of a long exposure (phases 1
and 2) versus a short exposure (phase 1)
Regression on: Age 10 13 Age 14 17 Age 18 21 Age 22 25
Enrollment 0.739*** 0.720*** 0.629*** 0.517***
(0.0105) (0.00798) (0.0108) (0.0156)
R2 0.767 0.713 0.509 0.385
Years of Education 0.739*** 0.720*** 0.629*** 0.517***
(0.0105) (0.00798) (0.0108) (0.0156)
R2 0.767 0.713 0.509 0.385
Job 0.739*** 0.720*** 0.629*** 0.517***
(0.0105) (0.00798) (0.0108) (0.0156)
R2 0.767 0.713 0.509 0.385
Tenth Grade 0.720*** 0.629*** 0.517***
(0.00798) (0.0108) (0.0156)
R2 0.713 0.509 0.385
High School 0.629*** 0.517***
(0.0108) (0.0156)
R2 0.509 0.385
University 0.629*** 0.517***
(0.0108) (0.0156)
R2 0.509 0.385
N 19,662 28,159 20,885 11,970
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the effect of
the instrument on treatment probability (first stage regressions) for each of
the outcome variables for which IV regressions were estimated. Sample is
children with Selben score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben II cutoff
(36.5 points) who were treated on phase 1. Regressions include linear and
quadratic polynomials of the distance to the cutoff.
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Table A.11: First stage regressions. Effect of a short exposure to BDH (during
phase 2 only) among untreated children in phase 1
Regression on: Age 10 13 Age 14 17 Age 18 21 Age 22 25
Enrollment 0.613*** 0.550*** 0.410*** 0.463***
(0.0301) (0.0224) (0.0238) (0.0265)
R2 0.544 0.457 0.309 0.319
Years of Education 0.613*** 0.550*** 0.410*** 0.463***
(0.0301) (0.0224) (0.0238) (0.0265)
R2 0.544 0.457 0.309 0.319
Job 0.613*** 0.550*** 0.410*** 0.463***
(0.0301) (0.0224) (0.0238) (0.0265)
R2 0.544 0.457 0.309 0.319
Tenth Grade 0.550*** 0.410*** 0.463***
(0.0224) (0.0238) (0.0265)
R2 0.457 0.309 0.319
High School 0.410*** 0.463***
(0.0238) (0.0265)
R2 0.309 0.319
University 0.410*** 0.463***
(0.0238) (0.0265)
R2 0.309 0.319
N 3,923 5,617 5,530 4,301
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table shows the effect of
the instrument on treatment probability (first stage regressions) for each
of the outcome variables for which IV regressions were estimated. Sample
is children with Selben score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben cutoff
(36.5 points) who were untreated on phase 1. Regressions include linear and
quadratic polynomials of the distance to the cutoff.
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Table A.12: OLS, ITT and IV estimates of the effects of a short exposure to BDH (during phase 1)
OLS OLS OLS OLS ITT ITT ITT ITT IV IV IV IV
Variables 9 12 13 16 17 20 21 24 9 12 13 16 17 20 21 24 9 12 13 16 17 20 21 24
Enrollment 0.00172 0.00310 0.0124* -0.000615 0.00499 0.0259*** 0.0460*** 0.00835 0.00647 0.0331*** 0.0669*** 0.0140
(0.00179) (0.00386) (0.00719) (0.00710) (0.00356) (0.00800) (0.0147) (0.0152) (0.00459) (0.0102) (0.0213) (0.0252)
Constant 0.988*** 0.650*** 0.381*** -0.0848* 0.991*** 0.975*** 0.395 0.224 0.985*** 0.924*** 0.463 0.219
Years Educ. -0.0225 -0.121*** -0.233*** -0.498*** 0.0676 0.0723 0.190** 0.0560 0.0845 0.0924 0.276** 0.0946
(0.0211) (0.0255) (0.0378) (0.0554) (0.0426) (0.0508) (0.0766) (0.114) (0.0551) (0.0648) (0.111) (0.190)
Constant 5.290*** 9.976*** 10.99*** 10.24*** 9.149*** 6.777** 11.71*** 10.39*** 9.447*** 6.853** 11.83*** 9.933***
Job -0.000108 0.00713** 0.0269*** 0.0307*** -0.000305 -0.0108 -0.0207 -0.0275* -0.000385 -0.0138 -0.0298 -0.0461*
(0.00135) (0.00340) (0.00709) (0.00763) (0.00262) (0.00708) (0.0146) (0.0162) (0.00338) (0.00901) (0.0211) (0.0270)
Constant 0.00269 0.225*** 0.614*** 0.132*** 0.00401* 0.00738 0.606** 0.876*** 0.00293 0.0216 0.636** 0.931***
Tenth Grade -0.0276*** -0.0284*** -0.0540*** 0.0183*** 0.0238* 0.00386 0.0214 0.0358** 0.0126
(0.00627) (0.00533) (0.00664) (0.00569) (0.0121) (0.00982) (0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0226)
Constant 0.841*** 0.828*** 1.042*** 1.024*** 0.995*** 0.971*** 1.025*** 0.950*** 0.841***
High School -0.0384*** -0.0546*** 0.0401*** -0.00234 0.0618*** 0.00790
(0.00719) (0.00768) (0.00881) (0.00888) (0.0214) (0.0267)
Constant 0.706*** 1.003*** 0.698** 0.968*** 0.763*** 0.850***
University -0.0312*** -0.0423*** 0.0304*** 0.00745 0.0439*** 0.0125
(0.00576) (0.00733) (0.0116) (0.0157) (0.0169) (0.0261)
Constant 0.305*** -0.0959* 0.742*** 0.440* 0.763*** 0.430*
N 25,237 27,160 21,478 17,845 24,986 26,895 21,181 16,265 24,986 26,895 21,181 16,265
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table reports the OLS, ITT and IV estimates
of BDH’s impact at the end of phase 1 for different age groups. Regressions use a linear polynomial of the distance to the cutoff. Sample is children with Selben
score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben cutoff (50.65 points). The P-values from goodness of fit test are shown after standard errors. The goodness of fit
test is obtained by jointly testing the significance of a set of bin dummies included as additional regressors in the model. The optimal order of the polynomial is
chosen using Akaike’s criterion (penalized cross-validation).
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Table A.13: OLS, ITT and IV estimates of the effect of a long exposure (phases 1 and 2) versus a short exposure (phase 1)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS ITT ITT ITT ITT ITT IV IV IV IV IV
Variables 10 13 14 17 18 21 22 25 26 29 10 13 14 17 18 21 22 25 26 29 10 13 14 17 18 21 22 25 26 29
Enrollment 0.00345 0.0873*** 0.136*** 0.0996*** 0.0303*** -0.00353 0.00347 -0.0265** 0.0331*** -0.00148 -0.00398 0.00715 -0.0390* 0.0609** -0.00995
(0.00314) (0.00687) (0.00674) (0.00557) (0.00530) (0.00349) (0.00797) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0118) (0.00474) (0.0115) (0.0209) (0.0265) (0.0228)
Constant 0.986*** 0.782*** 0.184*** 0.0785** 0.0195 0.989*** 0.828*** 0.332*** 0.122*** 0.0452** 0.992*** 0.836*** 0.325*** 0.144*** 0.00343
Years Educ. 0.0561 0.0564* 0.428*** 0.336*** -0.536*** -0.0580 0.00558 -0.0591 0.132 0.0184 -0.0534 -0.0494 -0.152 0.0315 -0.158
(0.0414) (0.0334) (0.0400) (0.0548) (0.0751) (0.0504) (0.0458) (0.0684) (0.114) (0.157) (0.0707) (0.0662) (0.114) (0.242) (0.311)
Constant 6.257*** 9.022*** 10.05*** 9.758*** 8.833*** 6.378*** 9.093*** 11.03*** 11.01*** 9.981*** 6.322*** 9.174*** 10.51*** 10.63*** 8.687***
Job 0.000443 -0.0268*** -0.0235*** -0.00123 -0.0838*** -0.00492* -0.00217 0.00952 -0.00690 0.0281 -0.00269 -0.00205 0.0254 -0.0366 0.0253
(0.00206) (0.00513) (0.00785) (0.00755) (0.00889) (0.00267) (0.00612) (0.0132) (0.0158) (0.0194) (0.00348) (0.00880) (0.0222) (0.0328) (0.0378)
Constant 0.00468 0.129*** 0.519*** 0.692*** 0.832*** 0.00973*** 0.0559*** 0.439*** 0.688*** 0.701*** 0.00705 0.117*** 0.489*** 0.694*** 0.846***
Tenth Grd. 0.0137 0.0502*** 0.0172** -0.0663*** -0.0128 -0.00206 0.0355*** -0.00727 -0.0182 -0.0112 0.0510* -0.0145
(0.00847) (0.00619) (0.00674) (0.00927) (0.0113) (0.00980) (0.0137) (0.0198) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0284) (0.0386)
Constant 0.623*** 0.686*** 0.591*** 0.477*** 0.608*** 0.835*** 0.745*** 0.679*** 0.672*** 0.733*** 0.645*** 0.427***
High School 0.0865*** 0.0446*** -0.0648*** -0.00101 0.0120 0.00922 -0.00414 0.00647 -0.00398
(0.00775) (0.00792) (0.0101) (0.0129) (0.0162) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0335) (0.0411)
Constant 0.516*** 0.464*** 0.374*** 0.635*** 0.620*** 0.475*** 0.605*** 0.624*** 0.359***
University 0.0595*** 0.0816*** -0.0142* -0.00801 0.00944 -0.00409 -0.0181 -0.000775 -0.0347
(0.00543) (0.00698) (0.00815) (0.0101) (0.0150) (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0319) (0.0323)
Constant 0.0951*** 0.136*** 0.124*** 0.175*** 0.217*** 0.149*** 0.170*** 0.225*** 0.0945*
N 21,991 31,476 23,822 16,798 11,082 21,800 31,197 23,508 14,297 8,947 19,661 28,159 20,885 11,970 7,458
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table reports the OLS, ITT and IV estimates of BDH’s impact at the end of phase
2 for different age groups. Regressions use a linear polynomial of the distance to the cutoff. Sample is children with Selben score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben cutoff (36.5 points) who were
eligible on phase 1 for the ITT estimates and children with Selben score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben cutoff (36.5 points) who were treated on phase 1 for the IV and OLS regressions.. The
P-values from goodness of fit test are shown after standard errors. The goodness of fit test is obtained by jointly testing the significance of a set of bin dummies included as additional regressors
in the model. The optimal order of the polynomial is chosen using Akaike’s criterion (penalized cross-validation).
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Table A.14: OLS, ITT and IV estimates of the effects of a short exposure to BDH (during phase 2 only) among untreated children in phase 1
OLS OLS OLS OLS ITT ITT ITT ITT IV IV IV IV
Variables 10 13 14 17 18 21 22 25 10 13 14 17 18 21 22 25 10 13 14 17 18 21 22 25
Enrollment -0.00459 -0.00735 -0.00956 -0.00734 -0.000251 0.0195 -0.0115 0.0290 -0.00307 0.0160 -0.0661 0.0710
(0.00479) (0.0135) (0.0186) (0.0168) (0.00879) (0.0281) (0.0375) (0.0386) (0.0146) (0.0358) (0.0624) (0.0471)
Constant 1.007*** 0.938*** 0.523*** 0.112 0.988*** 0.885*** 0.456*** 0.160** 1.005*** 0.958*** 0.474*** 0.0660
Years Educ. -0.774*** -0.0940 -0.205** -0.685*** -0.0953 0.161 0.0211 0.0135 -0.156 0.517** 0.370 0.931**
(0.0771) (0.0873) (0.0963) (0.147) (0.161) (0.168) (0.195) (0.318) (0.205) (0.210) (0.347) (0.439)
Constant 5.858*** 10.70*** 12.58*** 12.03*** 5.965*** 10.27*** 12.01*** 12.06*** 6.019*** 9.002*** 10.94*** 9.412***
Job 0.00250 0.000702 0.0184 -0.0330 0.00719 -0.0310 0.0579 -0.00222 -0.0110 -0.0312 0.0300 0.0669
(0.00393) (0.00977) (0.0192) (0.0208) (0.00866) (0.0196) (0.0389) (0.0467) (0.0127) (0.0264) (0.0660) (0.0638)
Constant -0.00183 0.185** 0.0840 0.519*** 0.0109 0.110** 0.293*** 0.648*** 0.00958 0.0890* 0.280*** 0.645***
Tenth Grade -0.0123 -0.00803 -0.0963*** -0.00954 -0.00554 0.0251 -0.0213 0.0335 0.121**
(0.0192) (0.0119) (0.0168) (0.0384) (0.0235) (0.0369) (0.0483) (0.0485) (0.0547)
Constant 0.768*** 0.991*** 0.911*** 0.746*** 0.969*** 0.862*** 0.549*** 0.788*** 0.582***
High School -0.00955 -0.118*** -0.00423 0.00802 0.0170 0.0749
(0.0179) (0.0200) (0.0352) (0.0446) (0.0636) (0.0653)
Constant 0.903*** 0.795*** 0.801*** 0.717*** 0.620*** 0.343***
University -0.0415** -0.0443** -0.00359 0.0288 0.0188 0.118**
(0.0165) (0.0197) (0.0338) (0.0438) (0.0522) (0.0570)
Constant 0.328*** 0.257** 0.298*** 0.290*** 0.154** 0.0709
Observations 1,813 2,663 3,030 2,482 1,783 2,579 2,907 1,974 3,922 5,617 5,530 4,301
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table reports the OLS, ITT and IV estimates of
BDH’s impact at the end of phase 2 for different age groups. Regressions use a linear polynomial of the distance to the cutoff. Sample is children with Selben
score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben cutoff (36.5 points) who were ineligible on phase 1 for the ITT estimates and children with Selben score within +/-2.5
points from the Selben cutoff (36.5 points) who were untreated on phase 1 for the IV and OLS regressions. The P-values from goodness of fit test are shown after
standard errors. The goodness of fit test is obtained by jointly testing the significance of a set of bin dummies included as additional regressors in the model. The
optimal order of the polynomial is chosen using Akaike’s criterion (penalized cross-validation).
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Table A.15: Effects of a five year exposure to BDH measured at the end of phase
two using ENES data
VARIABLES Lin 18 21 Quad 18 21 Lin 22 25 Quad 22 25
Took the ENES -0.0436 -0.116 0.0447 0.0417
(0.0609) (0.103) (0.0370) (0.0674)
Constant 0.343*** 0.369*** 0.0758 0.0779
Observations 5,530 5,530 4,301 4,301
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table reports the coefficients of IV regressions using a linear and a quadratic polynomial of the distance to the cutoff.
Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben II cutoff (36.5 points) who were untreated on
phase 1.
Table A.16: Differential effects of a long versus a short exposure measured by the
end of phase two using ENES data
VARIABLES Lin 18 21 Quad 18 21 Lin 22 25 Quad 22 25 Lin 26 29 Quad 26 29
Took the ENES -0.0596*** -0.0622* 0.00548 -0.0253 -0.00415 0.0176
(0.0200) (0.0360) (0.0210) (0.0410) (0.0171) (0.0313)
Constant 0.323*** 0.313*** 0.0769*** 0.0950*** 0.0329 0.0141
Observations 20,885 20,885 11,970 11,970 7,458 7,458
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. P-values from goodness of fit test
after standard errors. Table reports the coefficients of IV regressions using a linear and a quadratic polynomial
of the distance to the cutoff. Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben II cutoff (36.5
points) who were treated on phase 1.
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Figure A.2: Impact of BDH exposure on different variables measured at the end
of phase 1, phase 2 and differential impact of long (10 years) vs short exposure (5
years).
(a) Impact on enrollment. Children
17-20 by end of phase 1 (Linear)
(b) Impact on enrollment. Children
17-20 by end of phase 1 (Quadratic)
(c) Impact on HS graduation. Chil-
dren 17-20 by end of phase 1 (Lin-
ear)
(d) Impact on HS graduation.
Children 17-20 by end of phase 1
(Quadratic)
(e) Impact on 10 EGB. Children 17-
20 by end of phase 1 (Linear)
(f) Impact on 10 EGB. Children 17-
20 by end of phase 1 (Quadratic)
(g) Impact on university. Children
22-25 by end of phase 2 (Linear)
(h) Impact on university. Children
22-25 by end of phase 2 (Quadratic)
(i) Impact on 10 EGB. Children 22-
25 by end of phase 2 (Linear)
(j) Impact on 10 EGB. Children 22-
25 by end of phase 2 (Quadratic)
(k) Impact of 10 vs 5 years on years
of educ. Children 22-25 by end of
phase 2 (Linear)
(l) Impact of 10 vs 5 years on years
of educ. Children 22-25 by end of
phase 2 (Quadratic)
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